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THE FLAST DECISION ON STANDING OF
FEDERAL TAXPAYERS TO CHALLENGE
GOVERNMENTAL ACTION: MIRAGE OR
BREACH IN THE DIKE?
ALAN KARABu*

Some legal scholars have been disturbed at the seeming casualness with which the United States Supreme Court in recent years
has abandoned self-imposed limitations upon the Court's power.'
The philosophy of "judicial self-restraint" emphasizes the necessity for the Supreme Court and the lesser federal courts to refrain
from deciding and to abstain from deciding constitutional questions
unless decision is unavoidable.
There are many different rules which the Court has used to
avoid passing upon constitutional arguments advanced by litigants;
together, these rules constitute a "protective envelope" which must
be opened before the judiciary will exercise its independent governmental power of judicial review. The "envelope" historically has
included: refusal to issue advisory opinions; 2 refusal to make
declaratory judgments;3, affirmance without constitutional decision
if an adequate state ground exists; 4 reversal upon statutory
grounds rendering constitutional adjudication unnecessary; 5 refusal
7
8
to pass upon "political" questions; prohibition of feigned cases;
and dismissal without decision on the ground that the question is
"insubstantial."" The "envelope" can be protective because it cushions and reduces the number of confrontations between federal and
state power or between judicial and congressional-executive power
and thus diminishes the practical likelihood of successful efforts to
interfere with or cripple the Court. 9
B.A. 1951, LL.B. 1952, University of Cape Town; B.C.L., 1955, Oxford; LL.M. 1957,
Yale; Associate Professor of Law, University of North Dakota.
1. See, e.g., Kurland, The Supreme Court Today, 8 TRIAL 12 (April-May 1967).
2.
See 3 JOHNSTON, CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 486-89 (1893);
United States v. Fruehauf,865 U.S. 146, 157 (1961).
3. See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 362 (1911).
4. See Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935).
5. Cf. Henry v. Mississippi, 879 U.S. 448 (1965).
6. See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
7. See United States v. Johnson, 819 U.S. 802, 805 (1948).
8. See Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176 (1922).
9. Self-restraint, as philosophically advanced, was originally a liberal dogma to prevent the Court from interfering with state and congressional programs in the economic
sphere. With the passage of time, it has become increasingly associated with conservative
critics of the Court's own activism.
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As every student today knows, the United States Supreme Court
in recent years has been more judicially active than judicially
self-restrained. The "envelope" has been reduced.' Simultaneously,
it seems, the critics of the Court have become stronger, and in
1968 opponents won their first victories.1
Formalistic barriers to decision of constitutional questions may
be inconsistent with an "active" Court which is determined to keep
the Constitution alive as a real check upon unconstitutional activity.
Nevertheless, the Court must maintain its position of authority even
though it lacks some standard techniques (public relations department; patronage; built-in constituency). To the extent that formalistic barriers limit the exercise of judicial authority, they may maintain the Court's position of authority by foreclosing the formation of
an anti-Court majority in the other branches of government.
At the 1968 term, the Supreme Court was called upon to consider
a key aspect of one of the most important formalistic barriers-the
requirement of standing to sue. The aspect: does a federal taxpayer
have standing to challenge congressional expenditures as unconstitutional?
In 1923, the Court held in Frothingham v. Mellon1 2 that a
federal taxpayer lacked standing to assert that the Maternity Act
of 1921'3 was unconstitutional. The Court dismissed the taxpayer's
suit for failure to allege enough "direct injury" to confer standing.
It noted that a taxpayer's "interest in the moneys of the Treasury
. . . is comparatively minute and indeterminable" and that "the
effect upon future taxation, of any payment out of the [Treasury's]
funds, . . . [is] remote, fluctuating and uncertain..
.,14
The
dismissal for lack of standing made it unnecessary for the Court
to pass upon the merits of the taxpayer's argument that the statute
in question was unconstitutional because it exceeded the article I
powers of the Congress and invaded the province reserved to the
states under the tenth amendment.
Despite criticism, the Frothingham rule was not reversed.
In 1968, the question of taxpayer standing was very different
10. E.g., compare Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) with Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S.
549 (1946).
11. The Congress, In pasing the 1968 Omnibus Crime Bill, 82 Stat. 197 (1968), rejected
the Court's standards on Interrogation and confessions of criminal suspects (Miranda
rules) and the line-up rules. The nomination of Mr. Justice Fortas for the Chief Justiceship was subjected to unprecedented obstruction which Inconvenienced the Court in the
sense that Mr. Chief Justice Warren was compelled to delay retirement in order to maintain the Court at full numerical strength. In addition, a proposal to limit the habeas corpus Jurisdiction of the Court was only narrowly defeated in the Senate.
12. 262 U.S. 447, 487 (1923).
13. Act of Nov. 23, 1921, ch. 135, 42 Stat. 224. The act established a program of federal grants to states which undertook programs to reduce maternal and infant mortality.
14. 262 U.S. at 487.
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from what it had been in 1923 and the Court did decide differently.
The barrier was dropped for the plaintiffs in Flast v. Cohen15 as the
Court held that taxpayers had standing to challenge the constitutionality of the sections of the Elementary and Secondary Eduction Act
of 196516 which authorize federal funds for academic services and
instruction in religiously operated schools. Nevertheless, the Court
took great pains to maintain that "the result in Frothingham is
' 17
consistent with the test of taxpayer standing announced today.
The Court thus rejected the forthright elimination of a formalistic barrier which an active and politically-secure Court might have
elected while at the same time it rejected the affirmance of a rigid
bar to taxpayer suits which a self-restraint Court might have elected.
The effort to "square a circle" may be commendable, but the result
in Flast is disappointing and unlikely to endure.
Before analyzing and examining the specific decision and
rationale in Flast, it may be useful to discuss generally the purpose
of a "standing" requirement and to analyze the prime reason advanced in support of the standing requirement enunciated in
Frothingham.
The constitutional function of a requirement of standing to sue
may be to limit the activity of the Supreme Court and the lesser
federal courts to the role assigned the Judiciary in article III of
the Constitution. Under the Constitution, the Court may hear only
"cases" or "controversies." If the plaintiff lacks "standing" there
is neither a "case" nor a "controversy" and hence federal judicial
action is unconstitutional. The constitutional requirement of standing, inextricably intertwined with the definition of "case or controversy," is reasonably narrow.
The public policy purpose of a requirement of standing may be
to assure that the plaintiff will be sufficiently "interested" in the
case or controversy to prepare thoroughly his presentation and
arguments. It has usually been felt by federal courts that plaintiffs
have such interest and incentive only if they have suffered a personal
injury or invasion. Thus, it has been held that there is no justiciable
controversy in an action by a citizen against a government officer
complaining of alleged unlawful conduct, unless the citizen shows
that such conduct invades or will invade a private substantive legally
protected interest of the citizen-plaintiff. 1' The party must show
enough of a personal stake in the outcome of the case or controversy
"as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presenta15.
16.
17.
18.

392 U.S. 83 (1968).
79 Stat. 27, 20 U.S.C. §§ 24,1, 241e(a) (2), 821, 823(a) (8) (B) (Supp. 11 1966).
392 U.S. at 104.
Asociated Industries v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 702 (2d Cir. 1943).
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tion of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination
of difficult constitutional questions." 1" The public-policy requirement
of standing, inextricably intertwined with subjective notions of
motivational prerequisites to proper presentation of substantive issues, is broader than the constitutional requirement.
(Social scientists might perform an important service for the
courts if they tested empirically the proposition that personal involvement resulting from adverseness produces illumination for a courtand the converse of that hypothesis. Certainly, the skill shown by
many law students in moot court appellate arguments in which they
have little or no outcome interest, and the low illumination of issues
offered by some counsel in actual Supreme Court cases suggest
that factors other than personal involvement may be more important.)
Specific rules on "standing" have been developed and evolved
as extensions of the broader policy views. The Supreme Court in
Frothingham implicitly held that if the plaintiff's "interest" is
minute, he lacks standing. It found factually that the interest of
federal taxpayers in federal funds was "minute."
Upon the basis of 1923 federal income taxes, it was relatively
easy for the Court to conclude that the interest of any one federal
taxpayer or any small group of federal taxpayers was minute and
therefore insufficient to confer "standing."
Obvious changes have occurred since 1923. For example: In
1940, the annual federal government expenditures in the administrative budget were 9,062 millions of dollars; 20 in 1968, the estimated
expenditures totalled 169,856 millions of dollars. 21 In 1923, the
gross public debt of the federal government amounted to $200 per
capita; 22 in 1966, it was $1,725 per capita. 23 In 1940, the individual
federal income tax paid per capita of total population was $1124
($99 average per return filed); in 1965 (preliminary figures), the
federal income tax per capita was $255 ($735 per tax return filed) .25
Corporations paid 2.55 billions of dollars in federal taxes in 1940
and 26.54 billions of dollars in 1964.26
The federal taxpayer's interest in any given program may
still not be "significant," but it is certainly not "minute." As one
commentator observed: "When the Federal Government undertakes
19.

See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).

20.

BUREAU

OF THE CENSUS,

U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS,

COLONIAL

TIMES TO 1957, Series Y254-257 (1960).
21.
BuREAU
UNITED STATES,
22.
BUREAU
23. BUREAU

24.
25.
26.

OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE,
Table No. 538 (1960).

OF THE CENSUS, supra
note
OF THE CENSUS, supra note
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, &upra note
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, aupra note
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note

20,
21,
20,
21,
20,

STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE

at Series Y368-379.
at Table No. 566.
at Series Y302-311.
at Table No. 554.
at Series Y280-291.
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a program involving expenditure of ten billion dollars, the General
Motors portion is about two hundred million dollars-hardly a 'mi' 27
nute' sum in an absolute sense.
Mathematics, however, does not preordain results in constitutional adjudication. While the federal taxpayer can no longer
be said to have only a "minute" interest in public expenditures of
the federal government, it may be contended that he still does not
have a "requisite personal stake" in any specific expenditure.
The Frothingham rule was not followed by state courts when
they decided the question whether state and local taxpayers could
bring suits in the state courts raising questions of public concern.
Quite the contrary. The majority state rule is that "a citizen and
resident of the state . . . is capable of presenting to the courts his
petition for the enforcement by officials of their mandatory duties." 28
In 1960, taxpayer suits were available to challenge state action in at
least 34 state jurisdictions and to challenge municipal action in
virtually -every jurisdiction.29 There are limitations upon state taxpayer suits, but they are selective rather than blanket denials.
For example, a taxpayer who merely wishes to gain a forum to
debate a political question or a taxpayer who seems to be an officious
intermeddler may be denied standing. Thus, in state cases, taxpayers
were denied standing to prevent a police commissioner from discontinuing a police station;3 0 to challenge the legality of the organization of a school district; 3 1 to obtain a declaration of the right
3 2
of a school superintendent to use funds he might never receive.
The state decisions on standing of taxpayer-citizens should not
be automatically carried over to the federal courts because of differences in the nature of federal and state responsibilities (chiefly
as to foreign and defense affairs). Nevertheless, the "uniformly
adverse reaction of the state courts" to the Frothingham rule, is,
23
in Professor Davis' words, "most impressive. 3
Evidently, the arguments in favor of giving at least some standing to sue to federal taxpayers were "most impressive" to all but
one of the Justices (Harlan, J.) in the Flast case. They rejected the
"Government's position . .. that the constitutional scheme of separation of powers, and the deference owed by the federal judiciary
to the other two branches of government within that scheme,
27. Davis, Standing to Challenge Governmental Aotion, 89 MnN. L. Ruv. 853, 387
(1955).
28. Andresen v. Rice, 277 N.Y. 271, 281, 14 N.E.2d 65, 69 (1938).
29. See cases collected at Note, TaxpayiersW Suits: A Survey and Summary, 69 YALE
L. J. 895, n. 7, 900-02 n. 30-34 (1960). In 1929, only 19 states allowed state taxpayer suits
and 4 did not allow them. Annot., 58 A.L.R. 588 (1929).
30. Phillips v. Ober, 197 Md. 167, 78 A.2d 630 (1951).
31. Klrts v. Board of County Commissioners, 168 Kans. 739, 215 P.2d 642 (1950).
32. Lyon v. Bateman, 119 Utah 484, 228 P.2d 818 (1951).
83. 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATION LAW TREATISE 245, § 22.09 (1958).
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presents an absolute bar to taxpayer suits challenging the validity
of federal spending programs. ' 3 4 The Chief Justice declared for
the court: "[W]e hold that a taxpayer will have standing consistent with article III to invoke federal judicial power when he
alleges that congressional action under the taxing and spending
clause is in derogation of those constitutional provisions which operate to restrict the exercise of the taxing and spending power."3 5
The "most impressive" argument of all to some of the Justices
may have been the assertion that
the result of the Frothingham doctrine is to refuse to kill
the argument that many of our major spending programs
are unconstitutional, even though no one has standing to
raise the constitutional issue. If taxpayers' suits to challenge such programs should be discouraged, perhaps the
sound way to discourage them would be by deciding on
the merits of the constitutional issue that Congress has a
full power under the Constitution to tax and to spend to
provide for the public welfare.386
Certainly, the specific holding that Messrs. Flast et al. have standing
to assert the unconstitutionality of federal aid to parochial school
students makes it likely that Board of Education v. Allen," decided
the same day, will be applied to hold such aid constitutional. Thus,
the constitutional qua political objection to federal education aid
may be laid to rest.
However, minimizing the number of situations in which the
constitutionality of governmental activity is affirmed sub judice by
holding that no one has standing to attack constitutionality could
not have been an important policy objective of the Court in Flast.
The majority had no sooner announced that a taxpayer may have
standing to challenge congressional expenditure than it essayed to
develop a "test" of taxpayer standing which would bar taxpayer
suits which do not raise first amendment issues.
[1] A taxpayer will be a proper party to allege the
unconstitutionality only of exercises of congressional power
under the taxing and spending clause of Art. I, § 8, of the
Constitution. [2] The taxpayer must show that the challenged enactment exceeds specific constitutional limitations
imposed upon the exercise of the congressional taxing and
spending power and not simply that the enactment is
34. 392 U.S. at 98.
35. 392 U.S. at 105-106.
36. Davis, aupra, note 27, at 391.
37. 392 U.S. 236 (1968). In this case, the Court affirmed a decision that a New York
State statute requiring local public school authorities to lend textbooks free of charge to
all students in grades seven to twelve, including private and parochial schools, was constitutional and violated neither the establishment nor the free exercise clause.
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generally beyond the powers delegated to Congress by Art.
I, § 8.38
The Court declared that the first amendment's prohibition of laws
"respecting the establishment of religion" was a specific limitation
upon the congressional taxing and spending power. It implied
that there are no other specific limitations3 9 (e.g. ninth amendment,
tenth amendment) although the majority opinion did purport to
leave open the question whether "the Constitution contains other

specific limitations.'

'40

The viability of this specific limitation vs. general limitation
rule is central to evaluation of the decision. The dissenting Justice
and one of the concurring Justices found the distinction uncompelling.
Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring, voiced doubt "that the test it
lays down is a durable one . . . I think, . . .that it will suffer erosion. ' 41 Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting, noted that the specific-general test is not "in any sense a measurement of any plaintiff's interest in the outcome of any suit."'4 2 He asserted that the majority's
standard for the determination of standing and its criteria for satisfying that standard "are entirely unrelated." Mr. Justice Harlan
contended that neither logic nor history properly permit the conclusion that the establishment clause of the first amendment is a
"specific" limitation while the tenth amendment and the due process
clause of the fifth amendment are only "general" limitations: "The
difficulty, with which the Court never comes to grips, is that taxpayers' suits under the establishment clause are not in these3 circum'4
stances meaningfully different from other public actions.
In defense of the Court's test, it should be noted that it does
provide a limitation which will prevent a disgruntled taxpayer from
employing "a federal court as a forum in which to air his generalized
grievances about the conduct of government or the allocation of
power in the Federal System." ' 44 It does provide a test which can
prevent the possibility that a day will come when
the halls of Congress and of the state legislatures would
become with regularity only Act I of any contest to enact
legislation involving public officials in its enforcement or
38. 392 U.S. at 102-103 (emphasis added).
39. Cf. "There is no reason to suggest, and no basis in the logic of this decision for
implying, that there may be other types of congressional expenditures which may be attacked by a litigant solely on the basis of his status as a taxpayer." 392 U.S. at 115
(Fortas, J., concurring).
40. 392 U.S. at 105.
41. 392 U.S. at 107.
42. 392 U.S. at 121.
43. 392 U.S. at 128.
44. 392 U.S. at 106.
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application. Act II would, with the usual brief interlude,
follow in the courts.... Relaxation of standards of standing
would be . . . substantial movement toward constituting
the Supreme Court the Council of Revision that the Consti45
tutional Convention decided it should not be ....
There are other tests, however, which would also meet these
negative objectives. Professors Davis and Jaffe have discussed some
48
of them in detail.
It is arguable that the Court, in its desire verbally to reaffirm
the Frothingharndecision, has confused a standing requirement with
a point of substantive law. Is not the Court really saying that federal
taxpayers have standing to challenge any congressional expenditures
but that substantively the Court will only declare unconstitutional
those provisions which exceed specific constitutional limitations?
Such a formulation would have the advantage of greater logic: there
is little merit to the position that a federal taxpayer's standing to
sue is a function of the degree of specificity or lack of generality
of the constitutional clause upon which he rests his allegations of
unconstitutionality.
Even as restated, the specific-general limitation distinction
seems questionable. It may open the Court to the necessity to render
substantive decisions in new areas-areas which involve great complexity and present difficult problems. Amendment I is scarcely the
only specific limitation upon congressional spending authority. As
Mr. Justice Harlan observed, it is difficult to justify a system
may very well attempt to carry the Constitution overseas with
an argument that the due process clause is also a "specific" limitation. Ethnic groups might, for example, urge that it is unconstitutional for the United States to treat England more kindly than Italy,
47
to treat Ireland more kindly than Greece or Poland.
The dissenting judge in the three-judge lower court consideration
of the Flast case48 urged that Frothingham could be distinguished
to grant standing to the plaintiffs in this litigation. Under the
broadened federal taxpayer locus Judge Frankel proposed (his
proposed test was not adopted by the Court), he contended that
50
cases such as Pauling v. McElroy49 and Pauling v. McNamara
Brown, Quia Cuatodiet Ipsoa Cuatodes?-The School Prayer Cases, THE SUPREME
(1963).
46. See generally 3 K. DAVIS, ADMfNISTRATIVE LAW TRzATISE §§ 22.09-22.10 (1958 and
Supp. 1965); Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial leview: Public Actions, 74 HARv. L. REv.
1265 (1961); Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Reeview: Private Actions, 75 HARv. L. REv.
255 (1961).
47. Support would be found by combining Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) and
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
48. Flast v. Gardner, 271 F.Supp. 1, 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (Frankel, J., dissenting).
49. 278 F.2d 252 (D.C. Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 835 (1960).
50. 331 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 877 U.S. 933 (1964).
45.

COURT REV. 1, 15-16
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would come out no differently. Under the specific - general test
enunciated by the Supreme Court it is quite arguable that these
cases could come out differently. It is arguable that few interests
are more specific than a taxpayer's interest in protecting his bones
from disintegration from the effect of Strontium-90 introduced into
the atmosphere during nuclear tests, and few limitations more specific than the fifth amendment's prohibition against deprivation of
life.
Opinions may differ whether a grant of standing to federal taxpayers in cases such as these would or would not deprive the State
Department, Defense Department, and Congress of needed flexibility
in the conduct of American external relations. In any event, the
issue should be faced squarely rather than in the guise of deciding
whether the supremacy clause, which includes treaties, is a
"specific" or a "general" limitation upon the article I, section 8
taxing and spending power.
It seems clear that the Court's approach has raised several
problems which might have been avoided if the Court had clearly
overruled Frothingham and held that federal taxpayers have standing except where the subject matter of the litigation "is one confided to the final authority of branches other than the judiciary"' 51
and except where the subject is a "political question." Although
matters formerly thought inappropriate for adjudication as "political questions" are now considered appropriate,52 the idea of a
"political question" limitation on taxpayer-citizen suits is appealing.
It is certainly more germane to the role of the federal courts than
a general constitutional clause limitation.
It may be easier to understand, if not approve, the Flast decision if one notes that almost any other test for taxpayer suits would
have required the Supreme Court to overrule Frothingham and hold
that federal taxpayers have standing except where. . . .A majority
of the Court may have felt that at a moment when anti-Court sentiment in the nation is strong, it would be folly to strike openly at one
of the remaining components of the Court's protective envelope of
restrictive rules. Accordingly, the majority affirmed Frothingham
but minimized the negative force of that case by holding it inapplicable where a specific limitation is advanced as the argument against constitutionality. It thus introduced an element
of new and needed flexibility without opening itself to its
critics on an additional count of "changing the law."
Ironically, it is the critics of the present Court who might
61., 271 F. Supp. 1 at 12.
52. Compare Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)
(1946).

with Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.C. 549
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find Flast the most useful if persons of their view were ever
able to secure a majority of the Justices. It seems possible
that a Supreme Court composed of a majority of members
whose philosophical orientation is different from that of the
present majority might classify the tenth amendment as a
specific limitation upon congressional spending power and thereupon proceed to alter radically the federal-state balance achieved
in the last few decades. To the extent that "specific" and "general"
are definable subjectively, the erosion of federal requirements on
standing to sue in Flast v. Cohen does move the Court closer to
becoming a Council of Revision.

